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Abstract 
Any weakness in the financial institution is subject to the contagion mechanism. As result, the whole financial 
system will experience unpredictable financial risks and possible crisis, such as to a systemically relevant 
institution (e.g. Lehman Brothers’ default, 2008’s financial crises and Asian financial crises). The contagion 
mechanism (Quagliariello, M., 2009 [1] (Trapanese, M.) is a crucial element in the assessment of the cross-
border dimension. The direct cross-border contagion risks (idiosyncratic risks) are: risks related to cross-
border interbank links; money markets and cross-border ownership links; common shocks of foreign 
economies and global financial markets that can affect banks’ exposures due to changes in credit quality, 
market valuations and funding costs. Secondly, the indirect cross-border contagion risks (Indirect contagion) 
are caused by systematics risks that exclusively related to cross-border credit exposures (e.g. lending to non- 
financial institutions, credit risk transfer exposures as well as international syndicated lending), market risk 
exposures (by holdings of securities and off-balance sheet positions), common cross-border funding (by 
financing through market instruments and operational risk). 
From a theoretical point of view, said institutions are defined as risky banks, have unpredictable impacts on 
the smoothness of whole financial system. Moreover, these credit, market and liquidity risks represent the 
main triggers of crises. This paper is the second part of my theoretical study focused on the profitability and 
the soundness of European banks with an emphasis on the role of the Macro profile. In this paper, I also 
thoroughly investigated the macroeconomic determinants used to predict the Banking crises.  Moreover, this 
paper analyzed the history and behavior of European banks during financial crises, and 
the corrective measures taken by authorities, governments and supervisory institutes to bail out the troubled 
banks, or to support the banking system as a whole.  An extensive assessment of collected data resulted in 
detailed analysis of quantitative methodologies as well as the examination of the effectiveness of selected 
macroeconomic determinants to avoid the financial instability.  This study shows that the macroeconomic 
adjustments were called upon during the crises.  
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Introduction 
A stable macroeconomic framework in finance and economic theory exhibits low and predictable inflation 
rates, appropriate real interest rates, and sustainable and stable fiscal policy. These features are demonstrated 
by predictable and competitive real exchange rates and viable balance payments.  This description of a stable 
macroeconomic framework goes beyond the stability of macroeconomic factors to include other criterion 
where macro profile related factors are at levels conducive to growth.  During financial crises, measures are 
taken by authorities, governments and supervisory institutes to bail out the troubled banks, or to support the 
banking system.  These include financial stability packages; emergency liquidity assistances; recapitalization 
of the capital for the troubled banks; government capital injections; liability guaranties; exchanges rates fixes; 
international monetary fund programs; macroeconomic adjustment programs; strength supervision channels;  
government guaranties; interest free rates; foreign currency liquidity to maintain the exchange rates, external 
liquidity controls;  establishment of minimum requirement or new currency regulation for foreign currency 
rates; structure or restructure reforms for external assistances; foreign exchange intervention and more.  
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Therefore, looking back at the behavior of banks during times of financial crises, and bail out methods as a 
means of evaluating the soundness of banks (European banks) and as a survival mechanism, could give new 
insight on how to handle new upcoming crises.  The influence of macro profile was significantly and 
vigorously addressed during crises in most of financial reports and outlooks.  This paper gives a 
comprehensive analysis of the journey of European banks past and present and evaluates the most common 
methodologies used to measure the soundness of European banks during both crises and stable periods.  The 
impact of the macro profile on the soundness of banks is vital, but   equally important are considerations on 
how the determinants of profitability carry the weight of bank soundness. For example, if GDP increases, a 
bank could earn higher returns by risk-taking policies, which will lead to more profitability.  However, taking 
risk may raise real interest rates which will undermine the bank’s stability. In theory, both income and 
expenditure are likely to be pro-cyclical since profit depends on a bank’s expense policy and credit risk profile.  
Moreover, taking risk can also reflect losses of a bank and minimize profitability.  
Objectives of The Study 
The general objective of the theoretical study is to evaluate the impact of Macro profile on the soundness of 
banks. 
1. Determine whether it is plausible to only focus on the interaction between profitability and 
macroeconomic factors for future examinations of European banks soundness. 
Macroeconomic Determinants of Profitability and Bank Soundness - Literature review  
Soundness of banks can be interpreted by the soundness of profitability, if the external determinants are chiefly 
predictable and the internal factors are controlled by minimum requirements, regulatory and supervisory, so 
that banks can absorb any crisis that lies on the horizon.  In addition, macroeconomic factors such as GDP 
growth, high and unpredictable inflation, fluctuation of exchange rates, high real interest rates, and rapid credit 
expansion are associated with bank instability.  Early literature (Short, 1979) suggested that macroeconomic 
factors are unique for each bank, and for each country.  There are extensive empirical studies that have 
examined the impact of GDP on the bank profits (A Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou, 
P., Delis, M., & Staikouras, C., 2006; F. Pasiouras, K. Kosmidou, 2007; Anbar, A., & Alper, D., 2011; Sufian, 
F., 2011; Claeys and Vennet, 2008; Kosmidou, K., Tanna, S., & Pasiouras, F., 2005; Combey, A., & 
Togbenou, A., 2017).  The following scholars assessed the impact of inflation on bank profit, such as 
Athanasoglou, P., Delis, M., & Staikouras, C., 2006; Kosmidou, K., 2008; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Trujillo-
Ponce, 2013; Bourke, 1989; Molyneux and Thornton, 1992; Munteanu, I., 2012; Petria, N., Capraru, B., & 
Ihnatov, I., 2015; Combey, A., & Togbenou, A., 2017 and others.   
The first and most repeated external determinant in all examined empirical studies was inflation which causes 
variations in bank profitability.  Its effect depends on the assumption that wages and other non-interest costs 
will increase faster than the rate of inflation, which is not unusual and, accordingly, the annual growth in the 
consumer price index in each country was used as an independent variable.  Since the maturity of economy 
forecasts the forthcoming inflation precisely and consequently, banks can manage their operating costs and 
increase the rates on loans faster than the operating costs to earn higher profits.  The inflation and banking 
performance relationship has been introduced in the theory by Revell (1979) as he demonstrated that inflation 
affects bank’s profitability through salaries and operating costs. Nevertheless, the relationship between the 
inflation rate and profitability was vague and depended on whether the inflation forecasting was predictable 
or not (Perry, 1992; Revell, 1979).  Higher levels of economic growth will boost the lending operations in 
banks, and thus increase the margins, and improve the quality of their assets.  (Bourke, 1989 and Molyneux 
and Thornton, 1992) concluded that the relationship between either inflation or long-term interest rate and 
profitability was positive.   
With a fully anticipated inflation rate, bank management can adjust interest rates appropriately to increase 
revenues faster than costs, which should have a positive impact on profitability (Trujillo-Ponce, 2013; 
Athanasoglou, P., Delis, M., & Staikouras, C., 2006).  A higher level of income had a positive impact on the 
demand for deposits and reduced the incentive for banks to set higher deposit interest rates.  However, bank 
managements were unable to adequately forecast future inflation, even though, the monetary policy in the EU 
countries was usually predictable (Alexiou and Sofoklis, 2009).  Thus, higher rates could have been charged 
on loans, less interest rates being paid on deposits and so on (Goddard, J., Molyneux, P., & Wilson, J. O. 
2004).  
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The second most repeated determinate was GDP. The actual rate of annual GDP supports the argument of the 
association between economic growth and the financial sector performance. In rich countries with advanced 
banking sectors the effect was smaller. When the ownership of banks was addressed, the impacts of both GDP 
growth and inflation on bank performance were significant in all cases but with opposite signs for domestic 
and foreign banks, due to different levels of knowledge of country macroeconomic conditions and 
expectations concerning inflation rate between domestic and foreign banks (Pasiouras, F., & Kosmidou, K., 
2007; Havrylchyk, O., & Jurzyk, E. M., 2006; Combey, A., & Togbenou, A., 2017).  Additionally, domestic 
and foreign banks tend to serve different customer segments that may react differently under the same 
macroeconomic conditions.  On the contrary, an increase in the money market rate, ceteris paribus, makes it 
more attractive to invest in risk-free securities that represent an alternative to detain deposits; the subsequent 
reduction in deposits demand determines an upward pressure on the interest rate on deposits (L Gambacorta, 
2008). 
Poor economic conditions negatively correlated with the quality of the loan portfolio and bank profitability, 
thus generating credit losses and increasing the provisions of banks.  However, with any improvement in 
economic conditions, the condition of borrowers’ solvency and lending effect positively on banks’ 
profitability (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Bikker and Hu, 2002; Athanasoglou et al., 2008).  
Moreover, real GDP growth has a positive impact on banking performance through different channels: 
competition-stability, risk-taking, net interest income, improvement of loan losses, and operating costs 
(Berger, A. N., Klapper, L. F., & Turk-Ariss, R., 2009; Agoraki, M. E. K., Delis, M. D., & Pasiouras, F., 2011; 
Jiménez, G., Lopez, J. A., & Saurina, J., 2013; Bolt, W., De Haan, L., Hoeberichts, M., Van Oordt, M. R., & 
Swank, J., 2012; Calza A.& Sousa J, 2006). Also, higher GDP growth implies higher disposable income, 
lower unemployment and reduces defaults on consumer loans.  Net interest income and loan losses were 
therefore pro-cyclical with GDP growth.  However, the relationship between banks’ operating costs and GDP 
growth was indefinite.  Such unfavorable economic conditions (e.g. low GDP growth rates) may decrease 
deposits, loans and bank management costs while increasing the costs of collecting payments on loans (Bolt, 
W., De Haan, L., Hoeberichts, M., Van Oordt, M. R., & Swank, J., 2012).  
The real GDP per capita seems to have no significant effect on bank profitability (even though the results 
strengthen if it’s used) since the tight monetary policy of the examined period constrained bank lending.  Thus, 
as soon as price stability was achieved, we should expect a stronger relationship between economic growth 
and bank profits, through increased lending, improvement in bank asset quality, enhancement of borrowers’ 
access to the South East European markets and a decrease in supervisory toughness as well as uncertainty 
associated with macroeconomic instability (Athanasoglou, P., Delis, M., & Staikouras, C., 2006).  Few studies 
suggested that bank profits were correlated with the business cycle as measured by GDP (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2000; Bikker and Hu, 2000; Quagliariello, M. 2007). Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) stated 
that in countries where banking assets constitute a larger portion of the GDP, banks had smaller margins and 
were less profitable. The business cycle’s  
effect on profitability was positive, only when output was above its trend (Athanasoglou, SN Brissimis, MD 
Delis, 2008). Moreover, (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2000, Albertazzi, U., & Gambacorta, L., 2009; 
Quagliariello, M., 2007; Sufian, F., & Chong, R. R., 2008, Bolt, W., De Haan, L., Hoeberichts, M., Van Oordt, 
M. R., & Swank, J., 2012; Bikker and Hu, 2002) tried to assess the effect of business cycle on banks’ 
profitability. In theory, the combinations of several indicators of financial stability were better suited to 
indicate the state of bank system stability than individual variables.   
Even though the concentration ratio was a banking industry factor, it is always added when addressing the 
profitability and macroeconomic profile.  The concentration ratio measures the degree of banking competition 
in a national banking sector and it positively affects bank profitability, since larger banks tend to have higher 
margins.  Williams (2003) suggested that concentration ratio may act as a barrier to entry into markets where 
domestic banks are highly concentrated, implying a negative impact on profits (Chen, S. H., & Liao, C. C., 
2011).  One study showed that national market concentration and merger policy were significant, however, 
parent nation financial development and parent bank profits are additionally relevant (Sturm, J. E., & 
Williams, B., 2008), some studies suggested that market share and concentration become explanatory 
impotence when included in the model (Athanasoglou, P., Delis, M., & Staikouras, C., 2006; Smirlock, 1985; 
Evanoff and Fortier, 1988). Moreover, it was significantly negative by Staikouras, C. K., & Wood, G. E. 
(2004).  
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Finally, it seems that concentration was less beneficial in terms of profitability to the Greek commercial banks 
than competition (K., Kosmidou, 2008).  Money supply growth had no significant impact on profits in 
countries such as Portugal, Spain, France and Germany (Demirguc- Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Abreu and 
Mendes, 2001).  According to Maudos and de Guevara (2004), there was a positive relationship between 
market concentration and profitability, while (Petria, N., Capraru, B., & Ihnatov, I., 2015) suggested that 
market concentration diminished bank profitability.  In highly concentrated markets, banks tend to collude 
and therefore earn monopoly profits, thus the lack of competition has a positive effect on bank profitability 
(Short, 1979; Gilbert, 1984; Molyneux, P., Lloyd-Williams, D. M., & Thornton, J., 1994).  
The effective tax rate reflects the explicit taxes paid by the banks (mostly corporate income taxes). In general, 
the tax rates vary, and the variation offers an opportunity to see whether the differences in effective tax rates 
affect the profitability of the banks.  Due to higher effective tax rates, banks tend to shift a large fraction of 
their tax burden onto their depositors, borrowers, and purchasers of fee-generating services.  For example, 
Adler and Dumas (1980) pointed out that bank activities which were exposed to exchange rates had greater 
asset value volatility, while Chamberlain, S., Howe, J. S., & Popper, H. (1997) showed that exchange rates 
had the most direct effect on banks with foreign currency transactions and foreign operations, and even 
without such activities, exchange rates can affect banks indirectly through their influence on foreign 
competition, the demand for loans, and other aspects of banking conditions. 
Lower exchange rates encourage competitiveness of firms due to the price decline of goods manufactured at 
home and the increasing demand for foreign products (Luehrman, 1991; Addae, A. A., Nyark-Baasi, M., & 
Tetteh, M., 2014; A Combey, A Togbenou,  2017).  Thus, loans and deposits increase as well as banks’ profits.  
Nevertheless, a lower exchange rate may also reduce domestic consumer purchasing power, as imported goods 
become more expensive.  This situation may increase loans losses and have negative effects on bank’s 
profitability.  This would protect those banks from the full impact of the higher tax burden, but it would not 
eliminate the impact entirely.  Thus, consistent with the results of Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) a 
higher effective tax rate had a negative impact on bank profitability. Ukrainian banks profited from exchange 
rate depreciation despite of low profit. However, it showed variations in bank profitability among domestic 
banks and banks with foreign capital. Low exchange rate had a positive significant effect on income, and 
profit on foreign exchange transactions by anticipating exchange rate fluctuations (Davydenko, A. 2010). 
According to previous studies, there was a positive relationship between interest rates and banks performance, 
bank profits increase with higher interest rates that reflected positively on profitability of banks. This was 
because interest rate directly affected bank interest income and expenses profitability (Ally, Z., 2014). The 
effect of interest rates and banking market structure on bank profitability was examined by Perry (1992) and 
Trujillo-Ponce (2013). The interest rate on loans depended completely on real GDP and inflation.  Although, 
real GDP and inflation have a negative impact on the interest rate on deposits, and thus boosts loan demand 
and increases the interest rate on loans.  Lending operations will be encouraged due to the higher rate of money 
market caused by the opportunity cost of other forms of financing.  (Bourke, 1989 and Molyneux and 
Thornton, 1992) noted a positive relationship between inflation, profitability and the association between 
long-term interest rates and profitability.  High real interest rates were connected to higher interest margins 
and profitability.  For example, developed countries have higher real interest rates and higher interest margins, 
because demand deposits often pay zero or below-market interest rates.  Nevertheless, even very small 
reductions in banks' lending rates or increases in their borrowing rates may, in aggregate, resulted in 
substantial redistribution of income to bank customers.  Inflation involves higher costs - more transactions 
and generally more extensive branch networks and higher income from bank float.   
Market growth was not suggested extensively in the literature.  However, Short (1979) found that asset growth 
in individual banks was not significant.  It was suggested that growth in total market may be considered as a 
potential variable in the sense that an expanding market, particularly if associated with entry barriers, should 
produce the capability of earning increased profits.  Accordingly, annual growth in money supply in each 
country was suggested as an independent variable.  The significantly negative impact of ratio stock market 
capitalization to total assets of the deposit money banks to bank’s performance was also consistent with the 
results of Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999).  In other words, the stock market development offered 
substitution possibilities to potential borrowers, which consequently decreased banks’ profits.   
The improvement in the regulatory framework, the observed significant credit expansion and the gradual 
adoption of sound macroeconomic policies, have all positively contributed to competition.  While competition 
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could lower financial intermediation costs and contribute to an improvement in economic efficiency, it could 
reduce market power and the profitability of banks.  Thus, it appears that reform, at this stage of financial 
system sophistication, caused banks to offer increasingly competitive margins on loans and deposits, which 
in turn lowers profitability (Athanasoglou, P., Delis, M., & Staikouras, C., 2006). Moreover, De Guevara, J. 
F., & Maudos, J., 2004) emphasized that regardless of deregulation and higher level of concentration, 
imperfect competition among banks was associated with welfare loss, however, the market power increased 
during the 1990s in most of EU countries. 
The Efficient-Structure and Structure Conduct Performance hypotheses assessed the banks’ performance and 
profitability (Sathye, S., & Sathye, M., 2004; Doyran, M. A., 2012) and evaluated a bank’s profitability in all 
markets, the lack of potential rivalry empowers all market participations to gain more profits (Evanoff, 
Douglas D& D.L. Fortier, 1988).  The Efficient Structure hypothesis suggested that by increasing managerial 
and scale efficiency led to higher concentration, thus higher profits.  The Structure Conduct Performance 
model indicated the relationship between market power and bank profitability (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 
2007) since banking market concentration increased market power by gaining monopoly profits.  In addition, 
the Structure Conduct-Performance hypothesis stated that the higher profits were due to superior management 
and increased market share (especially in the case of small-to-medium-sized banks).  However, the empirical 
results of Papadopoulos, S. (2004) did not provide any support for the two efficient structure hypotheses. The 
cost advantages associated with greater bank size. For both hypotheses, deep analysis of the European banks 
will be needed to determine the impact on bank soundness and profitability.  
Finally, similar results were seen when Berger and Humphrey (1997) highlighted that the importance of cost 
efficiency hypothesis compared to the market-power theory in explaining bank profitability when frontier 
efficiency analysis was applied.  However, the Efficient-Structure theory explains the positive relationship 
between concentration and profitability as an indirect consequence of efficiency. The Efficient-Structure 
theory argues that the better managed banks or those with more efficient (and thus more profitable) cost 
structures could see their market shares increase, thus a higher degree of concentration. Moreover, their study 
addressed the government merger policy during crises due to the surmise that cost efficiency benefits from 
mergers policy. Huang, T. H., Chiang, D. L., & Lin, C. L. (2018) support that merger policy raises the market 
power and improve economies. However, there was no single pattern of mergers policies could dominate the 
different patterns of the methods of the mergers. Both the Structure-Conduct-Performance and Market-Power 
hypotheses were benefited and motivated by greater market power. The Industry concentration factor reflected 
two theories to explain how the degree of sector concentration affects bank profitability (Athanasoglou, M 
Delis, C Staikouras – 2006; Molyneux, P., & Forbes, W., 1995). Additionally, the real GDP growth rate had 
a positive impact on bank’s performance according to the well-documented literature on the association 
between economic growth and financial sector performance (F Pasiouras, K Kosmidou, 2007). 
Nahidah Naser (A Comprehensive Analysis of European Banking Soundness- Theoretical Study, 2019) stated 
that regardless of the methodology applied to examine the soundness of banks. The external factors increased 
the prediction of bank soundness, however, in some literature, the change was considered insignificant.  It 
was also noticed that the Moody’s structure for forecasting banks’ failures and credit profiles accurately 
employed the macro profile qualitative approach.   The macroprudential policies were set to prevent any future 
financial crisis, while the microprudential policies were set to prevent Banks’s failure and idiosyncratic 
shocks. The hypothetical adverse macroeconomic and financial market scenarios examine the systemic risk 
by introducing new regulatory and prudential tools. However, Macro stress testing proved unsuccessful to 
capture the riskier banks inside financial system and underestimated banks’ loan and credit losses. For further 
investigation, I would like to employ forecasting tree regression models and survival analysis to divide banks 
into different categories to predict distress banks through qualitative and quantitative approaches to 
forecast and estimate the soundness of banks while emphasizing the role of the most repeated 
predictable and unpredictable indicators. 
Table 1: The Most repeated Macroeconomic Determinants in literature (see Appendix A) 
Determinants Definitions   Frequency 
Inflation CPI annual inflation rate  29 
Concentration (Bank specific factor) Sum of the squared market shares of each bank assets  20 
GDP growth Real GDP, annual growth rate  20 
Interest rate  One-year real reference interest rate on loans  9 
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GDP per Capita Ratio of GDP to population  4 
Stock Market Ratio The ratio of stock market capitalization to total assets of the 
deposit money banks 
 7 
Exchange rate The price of one currency in terms of another currency  2 
Effective tax rate Total taxes over pretax profit (%)  2 
Market Growth Annual Growth in the Market  2 
Market Share % of a market (defined in terms of assets)  1 
Source: Own study. 
The next figures highlight the journey of Macroeconomic factors in European countries and their impacts 
during the crises period. 
 
Figure 1: Exchange Rates from 1999 - 2017: Data Resource. European Central Bank- Consolidated Banking data [2]. All 
banking groups / stand-alone banks irrespective of their accounting / supervisory reporting framework) 
 
Figure 2: GDP Growth from 2000-2017: Data Resource. European Central Bank- Consolidated Banking data 
Full sample (All banking groups / stand-alone banks irrespective of their accounting / supervisory reporting framework). 
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Figure 3: Inflation Rates from 1999-2017: Data Resource. European Central Bank- Consolidated Banking data. Full sample 
(All banking groups / stand-alone banks irrespective of their accounting / supervisory reporting framework) 
Figure 4: MFI Interest Rate Statistics 2003-2019. Data Resource: European Central Bank, Financial markets and interest 
rates- Loans. Oesterreichische Nationalbank) 
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Figure 5: Operational risk - basic indicator approach 2008-2018. Data Resource: European Central Bank, Consolidated 
Banking data. All banking groups / stand-alone banks irrespective of their accounting / supervisory reporting framework 
 
Figure 6: Credit risk - internal ratings-based approach (IRB) from 2008-2018. Data Resource e: European Central Bank 
Consolidated Banking data. (All banking groups / stand-alone banks irrespective of their accounting / supervisory reporting 
framework) 
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Figure 7: Credit risk – Standard Approach (IRB) from 2007-2018. Data Resource: European Central Bank Consolidated 
Banking data. All banking groups / stand-alone banks irrespective of their accounting / supervisory reporting framework) 
 
Figure 8: Market risk - Internal Ratings-Based Approach (IRB) from 2008-2018. Data Resource: European Central Bank 
Consolidated Banking data. 
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In depth analysis on past and present European Banks soundness  
The most important macroeconomics indicators of banking crises are related to deposits, capital, and foreign 
liabilities of bank. Typically, they represent the indirect indicators, of changes in the liquidity risk, credit risk 
and exchange rate risk, respectively. In other words, any fluctuations in these indicators indicate changes in 
the fragility of selected banks. This part is dedicated to analyses of the type of crises that European banks 
faced in the past and present, descriptions of the crises and measures / polices that were taken by governments 
and authorities (data collection was from European Central Bank [9]). The macro profile was heavily 
addressed during these crises.  
Table 2: The History of European Banks based on. Resource: European Central Bank/Euro Systemi  
Country             Type of crisis Brief description of the crisis Crisis management and policies 
Austria 
 
The crisis was due to high credit 
growth and leverage, afterward 
bank sector suffered misaligned 
incentives, low capitalization 
and profitability, mismatches 
and market illiquidity, exposure 
concentration.  The liquidity 
problem was trigged by Lehman 
Brothers’ default (2007-2016).  
 
 
The US subprime market hit the 
Austrian banking sector 
directly but was limited, and 
caused by dry-up of the 
interbank markets due to 
defaulting Lehman Brothers, as 
a consequence the long-term 
structure of the banking sector 
was weaker, and credit spreads 
raised in CESEE (Central, 
Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe) in early 2009. the 
downturn, the NPLs grew in 
2009. In spite of international 
investors’ fears, the situation 
stabilized in a short time due to 
the Vienna Initiative. 
Introducing a financial Market Stability 
Package to support Capital by the 
federal state of Austria in 2008, as well 
as funding guarantees and managing 
the public participations in the banking 
system using Interbank Market Support 
Act and the Financial Market Stability 
Act.  Introducing “soft law” and the 
new recommendations to cut the 
lending in foreign currency.  The new 
Minimum Standards issued by the 
FMA in 2013 were taken into 
consideration as well as the ESRB’s 
recommendations and supervisory 
experience to manage the lending in 
foreign currency by subsidiaries of 
Austrian banks abroad (especially in 
CESEE).  
Cross-border collaboration by FMA 
and OeNB was launched in January 
2009. Applied OeNB and the FMA 
supervisory guidance to strengthen the 
sustainability of the business models of 
large internationally Financial stability 
in Austria and host countries.  Most 
domestic banks’ business in the region 
followed the OeNB and the FMA Guide 
Principles in 2010. Requesting higher 
bank capital for the medium and long 
term, more balanced refinancing 
structure of exposed subsidiaries to 
absorb potential crisis situations. Three 
Austrian banking groups had applied 
the guidance; Erste Group Bank, 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank and UniCredit 
Bank Austria from 2012 to 2015.  Later, 
only Erste Group Bank and Raiffeisen 
Bank International applied the 
guidance.  
Belgium Leverage and credit growth, 
excessive mismatches and 
market illiquidity, exposure 
concentration, misaligned 
incentives (2007-2012). 
 
The Belgian financial sector 
was deeply affected by Lehman 
Brothers’ default.  A severe 
disruption in the wholesale 
financing markets, 
vulnerability of individual 
institutions and strong 
deleveraging to reduce the debt 
to increase the profitability and 
liquidity in most credit 
institutions and insurance 
companies.  
Government interventions to restore the 
stability and confidence in the financial 
markets, such as re-capitalizations, 
asset/liability guarantees, emergency 
liquidity assistance and an increased 
amount of deposit guarantees.  The 
state support played a huge role of 
solving the crisis.   
Bulgaria 1995-1997 The crisis was trigged during 
the transition process in the 90s 
and caused deficiencies in the 
banking sector and the 
In July 1997, introducing new 
measurements, such as tightening the 
fiscal discipline and currency board 
arrangement to overcome the crisis.  
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regulatory framework, 
hindered by the structural 
reforms in the economy, losses 
in the state budget and banks, 
poor fiscal discipline, 
unbounded monetization of 
fiscal deficits, inefficient 
unrestricted monetary policy 
and loss of confidence in the 
domestic banks. 
 
The principles of the currency board in 
Bulgaria were based on fixing the 
exchange rate of the national currency 
against the euro, full coverage of the 
central bank monetary liabilities, the 
central bank was obligated to sell and 
purchase levs against euro at a fixed 
exchange rate, central bank 
recommended no open market 
operations as well as no extended 
credits and guarantees to the 
government. The central bank provided 
credits only to the banks with 
liquidation risk that threatened the 
stability of the banking system. 
Cyprus   Stock market bubble during the 
1990s 
The burst of the stock market 
bubble was due to joining the 
EU in 2000, and other positive 
political and economic 
developments.  Both investors 
and consumers suffered major 
losses due to the crash in share 
prices; loss of confidence in 
market, some trading account 
debts were written off by banks 
and investment firms which 
spurred customers to buy 
shares. 
Nothing to report. 
 The Cypriot banking sector 
showed leverage, excessive 
credit growth, exposure 
concentration, mismatches and 
market illiquidity, misaligned 
incentives (2011-2016).  
Cypriot economic growth and 
ambitions to become a leading 
international provider of 
banking services trigged the 
crisis by attracting significant 
inflows of foreign deposits in 
the banking system and 
imposing higher interest rates 
on deposits. Consequently, a 
dramatic expansion of banks’ 
balance sheets, both 
domestically and abroad 
transferred as imbalances and 
vulnerabilities in the banking 
sector.  The rapid expansion of 
domestic credit was due to 
significant inflows of foreign 
deposits and banks imprudent 
lending practices, inadequate 
risk management and corporate 
governance frameworks 
escalated the real estate boom.  
Fast acceleration of bank loans 
accompanied by growth of debt 
for both households and non-
financial corporations and 
increased the vulnerability to 
absorb shocks.  High lending 
rate exercises in banking sector 
deteriorated the financial 
position and their ability to 
meet their debt obligations.  
There was a rapid increase in 
non-performing loans, 
catastrophic losses during debt 
restructuring of Greek 
Government and the Private 
Sector Involvement.  The 
solvency of the Cypriot 
Due to the lower rating of Cyprus 
banks, the liquidity buffers were 
gradually worn away, and banks were 
unable to raise liquidity through the 
refinancing operations of the 
Eurosystem, thus the Central Bank of 
Cyprus provided Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance to cover banks’ liquidity 
needs.  Downsizing of the credit 
institution sector was needed given its 
large size and the accumulated 
imbalances by the carve-out of the 
Greek operations of Bank of Cyprus, 
Cyprus Popular Bank and Hellenic 
Bank pursuant to the provisions of The 
Resolution of Credit as well as other 
Institutions Law of 2013.  Also, capital 
restrictions were imposed on banks, 
thus decreasing liquid assets in the 
Greek and Cyprus sovereign bonds. 
Then, customer deposits were 
downgraded and a decline in cash 
inflows from loan repayments 
followed, since the proportion of 
customers that did not meet the 
specified repayment schedule of their 
debt obligations increased. 
State-aid supported the Cyprus Popular 
Bank (CPB) by recapitalizing the bank 
as a loan. The remaining assets of the 
bank, including foreign subsidiaries 
and branches were liquidity injected to 
compensate uninsured depositors, other 
creditors, while shareholders of the 
bank remained in the legacy part of 
CPB. BoC was recapitalized by the 
bail-in of shareholders, bondholders.the 
European Financial Stability Facility / 
European Stability Mechanism and the 
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banking sector and the quality 
of banks' loan portfolio 
deteriorate sharply in mid-2011 
amid the unfavorable 
macroeconomic environment 
in Cyprus and Greece.  More 
specifically, the three largest 
domestic banks suffered total 
losses due to the ‘haircut’ of the 
Greek Government Bonds 
(GGBs).  The banking sector 
suffered accumulating current 
account deficits, significant 
losses in competitiveness, 
growing budget deficits and 
inflating public debt. 
International Monetary Fund in mid-
2012 to recover the economy and to 
ensure conditions of financial stability.  
A Cyprus macroeconomic adjustment 
program was reached at the end of 
March 2013.  The key objectives were 
to restore the soundness of the Cypriot 
credit institutions sector, rebuild 
depositors’ and market confidence by 
thoroughly restructuring, strengthening 
the supervision role and curtailing 
financial institutions, as stated in the 
terms of the Eurogroup agreement in 25 
March 2013.  
 
Czech The Czech banking sector had 
leverage and rapid credit growth 
as early signs of crisis, along 
with misaligned incentives and 
infrastructure resilience.  Debt-
financed privatization of the 
enterprise sector and capital 
inflows in a regime of fixed 
exchange rate escalated the 
crisis, resulting in credit growth 
and severe external imbalances.  
Misaligned incentives caused by 
an institutional setting and a 
moral hazard escalated the credit 
growth and contributed to bank 
problems after the currency 
crisis ended.  The bank crisis was 
also escalated by the 
privatization process of the 
enterprise sector in which 
numerous legacy assets were 
transferred from communist 
regime to corporations (1997-
2000). 
In the 1990s, the external 
imbalances were caused by 
overheating economics.  
Several measures were applied, 
such as increasing the interest 
rates and stabilization 
packages.  During that time, 
strong capital inflows and fixed 
exchange rates occurred. In 
1998, the need to stabilize the 
banking sector by providing 
guarantees for legacy assets 
accelerated the problem. 
Finally, one of the systemic 
banks had to merge with 
another systemic bank after 
defaulting.     
 
The first stabilization package was 
introduced in April 1997, the second 
stabilization package in the mid of 1997 
through different channels: fiscal 
tightening: wage freezes; import 
deposits; legal and institutional 
reforms.  In May 1997, FX intervention 
(a conventional monetary policy tool) 
was employed by the central bank.  
Around mid-1997, the exchange rate 
regime was changed to manage floating 
of currency. Institutional consolidation 
from 1991 – 2007 provided guarantees 
for banks with bad assets. 
Germany The crisis was due to the failing 
of Herstatt bank 1973.  Prior to 
1974, there was increasing 
leverage in real estate 
construction and an inflationary 
environment that led to 
misjudgment of the 
creditworthiness of borrowers 
and misallocation of capital in 
banks.  The banking sector was 
vulnerable to a systemic banking 
crisis aka a “credit crunch” due 
to the implementation of 
counter-cyclical and/or real 
estate related macro-prudential 
instruments.  In March 1973, the 
tightness of liquidity regulation 
(counter-cyclically), revoking an 
easing of those standards in 
1969. 
During 1970s, the floating 
exchanges rates reassured new 
trade opportunities, while 
inappropriate risk management 
in banks occurred.  In June 
1974, the closure of the 
insolvent Herstatt bank caused 
a disruption in the settlement of 
a large number of foreign 
exchange payments.  
Internationally, the loss of 
confidence in the banking 
sector due to bank’s failure and 
fragility (Euro-currency 
market) after a boom period.   
Domestically, a number of 
smaller and mid-sized private 
banks suffered deposits 
outflows due to a fragile 
economic environment caused 
by oil-price shock, high 
inflation, and weak industrial 
investment and slowing 
residential construction. 
The Bundesbank managed to restore 
the whole rediscount quotas and offered 
unlimited Lombard credit at standard 
rate.  Refinancing private and regional 
banks improved, as well as the 
reconstruction Loan Corporation 
(KFW) bolstered the lending process to 
small firms.  The Bundesbank 
participated in the establishment of a 
liquidity consortium bank to support 
banks that were facing temporary 
difficulties.  The incomplete deposit 
insurance scheme was reformed.  
Regulations regarding banks' foreign 
exchange transactions and tighter 
capital ratios reduced the likelihood of 
any similar events in the future.  
International interbank assets and 
liabilities suffered a sharp decline.  In 
December 1974, the BIS’s Committee 
on Banking Regulations and 
Supervisory Practices. 
  
 The early 2000s crisis was 
driven by: exposure 
concentration, without violation 
Banks adjusted their balance 
sheets and corrected the 
lending standards in a pro-
The most distressed banks had to 
stabilize or merge within their 
respective banking groups.  The 
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of standard large exposure 
regulations, accumulated credit 
and stock market valuations 
were written off; leverage and 
excessive credit growth 
appeared in balance sheets of 
non-financial borrowers and 
banks, where leverage increased 
the risk of pro-cyclical behavior 
in the downturn; misaligned 
incentives: conflicts of interests 
between financial advisors / 
brokers / stock market analysts / 
investment banking. 
Additionally, market 
manipulation that led to legal 
reforms structural vulnerabilities 
in the German banking sector 
(high cost and low market) 
(2001-2004). 
cyclical way. From the three 
potential shock absorbers in the 
banking sector, two were 
strongly deteriorated: persistent 
low profitability across all 
banking groups and hidden 
reserves were worsened by 
falling asset prices as well as 
credit write-downs. The 
cyclical downturn after years of 
a domestic credit boom and the 
burst of the “new economy" 
stock market bubble negatively 
impact the German financial 
sector. Higher risk of a 
downward spiral due to the 
failure of financial system 
mechanisms between the end of 
2002 and beginning of 2003. 
banking supervisory authority took on 
Bankgesellschaft Berlin as a potential 
restructuring case, due to its real estate 
exposure losses.  The so-called ‘risk 
shield’ by means of guarantees and 
injecting money was applied to 
strengthen confidence in the financial 
system along with   Regulatory issues, 
such as transparency and addressing the 
conflicts of interest in the financial 
industry.  The EU commission accepted 
these measures of state aid. 
 During the 2007 international 
liquidity crisis, securitizations 
along with many underestimated 
factors escalated the crisis, such 
as exposure concentration and 
market liquidity risks as banks 
activities collapsed (in case of 
Germany: IKB and SachsenLB).  
However, the stressfulness of 
SIFIs due to exposure 
concentration, then the default of 
Lehman Brothers prompted 
government intervention.  Some 
German banks experienced a 
high level of concentration to 
CRE and excessive leverage, as 
result higher risk of pro-cyclical 
and the crunching of credit 
supply.  The effect extended to 
stressed EMU sovereigns and 
banking systems with lack of 
comprehensive stabilization 
policies (2007- 2017). 
Some German banks had 
sizeable exposures to 
commercial real estate and the 
shipping industry.  At the 
beginning of the crisis, 
exposures to stressed EMU 
sovereigns and banking 
systems were severely affected 
the financial sector in Germany 
due to the lack of 
comprehensive stabilization 
policies.  Drying up of both 
market liquidity and funding 
liquidity led to the financial 
crisis. The weakness of the 
systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs) 
was also a key element after 
bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers.  Accumulated 
systemic risks were moderated 
by domestic credit demand 
expanding.  High leverage 
elevated the risk of pro-cyclical 
fire sales and a credit crunch. 
The liquidity crunch in some 
institutions caused the crisis.  In 2007, 
ECB made unlimited adjustments 
operations after Germany’s KFW-bank 
had taken over the distressed IKB 
Deutsche Industriebank to provide 
outsized liquidity lines to special 
purpose vehicles.  Applying measures, 
such as substantial government 
intervention to SIFIs, nationalization of 
Hypo Real Estate, recapitalizations, 
guarantees and ‘risk shields’.  Similar 
measures took place at the level of 
Bundeslaender for some 
Landesbanken.  At the European level, 
the ESCB stabilized the situation by 
extraordinary monetary policy 
operations, complementarily the ESM 
was established. 
Denmark Leverage and rapid credit 
growth as early signs of crisis.  
Strong boom caused by low 
interest rates.  A highly indebted 
economy, large current-account 
deficits and a structurally weak 
labor market which required 
strong fiscal improvements and 
incentives for private savings 
(1987-1995). 
From 1987-1993, there was 
persistent low GDP growth, 
higher unemployment rates, a 
highly indebted economy, large 
current-account deficits and a 
structurally weak labor market 
after few years of strong 
economic upswing.  Owing to 
the overheating of the economy 
in the mid-1980s, strong fiscal 
improvements and incentives 
for private savings were 
required.  With the weak 
Danish krone, high wage 
increases were agreed to in 
1987 followed by monetary 
tightening and market 
interventions in the currency 
market to defend the krone as 
well as higher the interest rates.  
Denmark’s Nationalbank 
provided standby liquidity 
The Danish government and Danmarks 
Nationalbank assisted only five 
distressed banks.  They also assisted 
Denmark’s Nationalbank through 
standby liquidity facilities for 
Denmark's second largest bank, 
Unibank.  To defend the Krone, 
monetary tightening and market 
interventions in the currency market 
were required. 
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facilities for Denmark's second 
largest bank, Unibank and 
several distressed banks.  
Unfortunately, the crisis 
managed to also greatly impact 
the small and medium-sized 
banks. 
 Danish Banks suffered from a 
long period of strong lending 
growth, a large share of 
property-related exposures, 
leverage and rapid credit growth 
(2008-2013). 
. 
Prior to this crisis, high real 
growth in the banks' 
outstanding amounts of loans, 
high lending growth, higher 
write-downs on loans and 
deteriorated credit quality.  
Short-term funding through 
international money and capital 
markets was unstable and 
easily affected by deposits and 
long-term bond financing.  The 
international liquidity crisis 
(2007) developed into a 
genuine global credit crisis 
later.  The banks had large 
customer funding gaps for the 
period of strong lending 
growth.  In 2009, unexpected 
large falls in real GDP and in 
exports coupled with the low 
Danish GDP and weak 
economy, drove the county into 
deep recession. 
To close the gaps, short-term bonds 
provided by banks, and borrowed from 
foreign credit institutions.  Government 
provided capital injections and gave the 
opportunity to purchase an individual 
government guarantee on debt issues to 
credit institutions, thereby providing a 
safety net for the banks through 
comprehensive government guarantee 
for depositors.  Credit facilities and the 
expanded collateral base were provided 
by Denmark’s Nationalbank. 
 
Estonia The loss of trade with the Soviet 
Union in 1990 caused a trade 
shock, the monetary policy 
tightened, and a currency board 
was instituted to end the post-
transition inflation.  A severe 
recession bottomed out in 1992-
1993. Leverage and rapid credit 
growth as early signs of crisis, 
exposure concentration 
mismatches and market 
illiquidity, misaligned 
incentives. 
 
 
The economic losses were in 
the double-digits, due to 
unqualified and inexperienced 
bank managers as well as poor 
banking sector regulation.  The 
high share of non-performing 
assets caused liquidity 
problems in banks.  The central 
bank enhanced banking 
regulation and strengthened 
banking supervision.  The 1992 
crisis caused moratoriums in 
three largest banks and foreign 
exchange deposits in the Soviet 
Vneshekonombank were 
frozen in two of them.  Quick 
measures were undertaken by 
the central bank and 
government to support the 
stabilization of the banking 
system.  Many small banks 
could not survive or be merged 
with other banks.  There was a 
loss of confidence in the 
Estonian banks due to the 
delayed settlement of accounts.  
After independence, many 
banks and private 
entrepreneurships were 
reestablished. 
Government and the Bank of Estonia 
provided liquidity assistance and 
injected capital to form new banks.  A 
part of the non-performing assets of 
Balti Ühispank and Põhja-Eesti 
Aktsiapank were moved into a separate 
fund and the remaining assets were 
transferred to Põhja-Eesti Pank. 
 Leverage and rapid credit 
growth as early signs of crisis, 
exposure concentration (1994-
1995). 
In 1994, Estonia had liquidity 
problems and a large amount of 
bad loans after the Estonian 
government and the largest 
municipality transferred their 
deposits to the government-
owned bank.  Eesti Tööstuse- ja 
In November 1994, another bank, Eesti 
Tööstuse- ja Arengupank and Eesti 
Sotsiaalpank merged.  However, there 
was no improvement and the 
liquidation of the bank was announced 
in May 1995. 
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Arengupank and Eesti 
Sotsiaalpank banks had 
difficulties even after merging 
and lost interested investors in 
the banking sector.  Eesti Pank 
supplied liquidity assistance as 
well as injected capital to the 
bank, however, the liquidation 
of the bank was announced in 
May 1995.   
 Exposure concentration, 
misaligned incentives (June 
1998- April 1999). 
Higher exposure to the stock 
market due to large amounts of 
non-performing assets.  In 
1997, the Asian crisis crashed 
the stock market, which led to 
the deterioration of the bank's 
solvency until it went into 
default.  Some Banks were hit 
by the stock market, and later 
affected by the Russian crisis in 
1998 which caused a decline in 
investments and losses of 
deposits, partial default and 
devaluation.  The Bank of 
Estonia injected capital in 
Optiva Bank (formerly Eesti 
Forekspank) and merged with 
Eesti Investeerimispank. 
Partial compensation was made by the 
Government to Eesti Maapank due to 
the inefficiency of the deposit 
guarantee system.  Capital was 
provided to Optiva Bank (formerly 
Eesti Forekspank) by Bank of Estonia, 
and then merged with Eesti 
Investeerimispank in October 1998.  
 
Spain The banking status quo was 
broken up and many of the 
existing institutions had 
insufficient funds.  During 
1970s, the Spanish economy was 
vulnerable due to the industrial 
crisis. 
In the wake of the 1962 Credit 
and Banking Law, many of the 
existing institutions had 
insufficient funds and were 
vulnerable to the 1970s 
industrial crisis that severely hit 
the Spanish economy.  The 
crisis was generated by general 
economic factors, such as the 
oil crisis and the hardest 
inflationary episode, with price 
dislocation, failed assessments 
and the inevitable corrective 
measures. 
The Deposit Guarantee Fund was 
established by the Spanish Bank to 
overcome the crisis and to cover 
customer deposits of troubled 
institutions.  Moreover, the crisis 
required a quick reconsideration of 
bank accounting standards, 
subsequently of prudential regulations 
and an intense fiscal stabilization effort. 
 Leverage and rapid credit 
growth as early signs of crisis, 
exposure concentration.  The 
global financial crisis, domestic 
housing bubble and excessive 
credit growth deeply hit the 
Spanish economy.  The 
recession period, an over-
exposure of savings banks to the 
real estate sector, other EA crisis 
and the weaknesses of the EA 
design have escalated the 2009-
2013 banking crisis (2009-
2013). 
 
The Spanish crisis had several 
phases: economic crises due to 
the collapse of the real estate 
market; deep banking crisis or 
the combination of these two 
crises.  Moreover, the distress 
in other EU members led to 
severe sovereign tensions in 
2011.  However, the fiscal 
position of Spain was relatively 
sound, but the economic 
recession and the banking crisis 
exhausted the loss-absorption 
capacity of government debt, as 
result sovereign tensions and 
capital flight.  The crisis 
initially was trigged by housing 
bubble crisis, and then by the 
international financial market 
crisis. 
Insufficient capital and loss-absorption 
capacity were covered by the 
recapitalization measures, burden 
sharing mechanisms and public funds 
contributions in eight banking groups.  
The introduction of new legislation on 
savings banks and the establishment of 
bank foundations by the corporate 
regime to govern the savings banks 
were warranted.  With public support, 
some banks resized through an intense 
process of rationalizing their balance 
sheets.  To tackle the crisis, 
unconventional monetary policies, 
creation of the SSM, and EU political 
measures were employed. 
Finland Leverage and rapid credit 
growth as early signs of crisis 
after deregulation of the 
financial markets from 1991-
1998.  Excessive risk-taking 
Exposure concentration in 
domestic corporate loans.  Loss 
of confidence in SKOP bank.  
Lower interest rates and rapid 
credit growth escalated a real 
In September 1991, the Bank of Finland 
stepped in to save confidence in SKOP 
Bank, and to take over control of the 
bank to maintain the stability of 
financial system.  There were a lot of 
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spurred by misaligned 
incentives.   
estate bubble and overheated 
the economy in 1988, during 
which monetary policy was 
constrained due the exchange 
rate regime.  The currency 
depreciated sharply by the end 
of 1991 and later, there were 
defaults in business deals with 
foreign currency obligations. 
The economy suffered from a 
worldwide recession, a major 
tax reform that limited the 
deductibility of interest 
payments, coupled with high 
debt burden, burst the bubble 
and caused a recession.  
Monetary tightening started in 
1989.   
exports declined by over 6% as 
well the domestic demand by 
about 8%.  The unemployment 
rate exceeded 10% in 1991.  
Collapsing the domestic 
economic activity with a severe 
decline in profitability that 
worsened the banks’ financial 
position.  Moreover, with the 
collapse of Soviet Union, 
Finland’s exports were greatly 
decreased.  Many financial 
institutes   chose bankruptcy. In 
1992, Finnish banking had a 
severe systematic crisis without 
suffering any failure.  For 
example, SKOP Bank was 
taken over by the Bank of 
Finland.  Then, the Finnish 
banks started major 
restructuring of the banking 
sector, and the crisis ended in 
1995.  Later, the Bank of 
Finland allowed the markka’s 
exchange rate to float 
temporarily. 
mergers in local banking groups, both 
in savings banks and in co-operative 
banks to handle the crisis.  Some banks 
had their banking licenses revoked, and 
then they were converted into asset 
management companies.  In 1995, prior 
to crisis, there was no proper legislation 
was in place to manage the situation, 
especially after the merger of Kansallis-
Osake-Pankki and Union Bank of 
Finland to form one of the Finland’s 
largest commercial banks. 
France During the 1990s This crisis had complex stages.  
France had a high GDP growth 
and deregulation from 1987 to 
1990 that caused a huge 
increase in both residential and 
commercial real estate prices.  
A sharp decrease in 
commercial real estate 
properties had a negative 
impact on the financial position 
of borrowers and caused their 
default, despite a bounce back 
effect in early 1991.  The ERM 
crisis affected the European 
partners and France in 
September 1992; the recession 
in real estate; the fragile state of 
the banking sector and the near 
bankruptcy of the Crédit 
Lyonnais due to real estate 
market downturn and a risky 
business model strategy.  
Second, due to the non-
performing loans and the fall in 
None. 
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value of real estate property 
assets in portfolios; they 
substantially reduced the 
supply of loans to investors.  
The sharp increase in oil prices 
during Persian Gulf War crisis 
caused a severe 
macroeconomic slowdown and 
a significant decrease in real 
estate prices.  The recession hit 
its lowest level at the beginning 
of 1993.  A budget motivated 
by the upturn of the economy in 
1993 and lasted for one year. 
 Leverage and rapid credit 
growth as early signs of crisis, 
mismatches and market 
illiquidity, infrastructure 
resilience (2008-2009). 
 
The cross-border crisis hit the 
financial sector and hampered 
exports that ended an era of 
growing GDP, booming real 
estate prices and falling 
unemployment, especially after 
default by Lehman Brothers 
and a freezing of the interbank 
market.  The external shocks 
and financial crisis caused a fall 
in investment and 
consumption, as well as 
deterioration of the economic 
environment.  High 
unemployment led to depressed 
consumption, declining the 
investment and lower demand.  
As a result, the unemployment 
rate rose from 7.5% to 9.5%.  
By end of 2009, there was a 
sharp decrease in positive GDP 
growth and unemployment. 
Several measures, such as: EU state aid 
case NN50/2008 to restructure and 
inject capital into Dexia; EU state aid 
case N548/2008 provided a French 
bank guarantee scheme November 
2008-November 2009; EU state aid 
case N613/2008 and N251/2009 
provided a French banks 
recapitalization scheme in December 
2008 and in March 2009, then finally, 
EU state aid case N249/2009 to merge 
and inject capital into Banque 
Populaire/ Caisse d'Epargne. 
Greece  2010-on going In 2009, the government deficit 
extended to a double-digit 
percentage of GDP, while the 
public debt was 115.1% of 
GDP.  In April 2010, Greece's 
credit ratings were 
downgraded.  The yield spread 
between Greek and German 
government bonds triggered by 
the negative developments, 
thus increased borrowing and 
the debt servicing costs for the 
Greek government. 
The most significant measures were  
(European Central Bank: EU/ECB/IMF) 
Financial Support Program (2010); 
Establishment of Hellenic Financial 
Stability Fund to fully recapitalize 
banks (2010); Adoption of the new 
resolution Framework (2011); 
Implementation of the EU Summit 
Decision on PSI (2011); 
Recapitalization exercise covering all 
risks conducted by BoG (2012); 
Implementation of PSI+ (2012); 
increase of the HFSF capital (2012); 
Establishment of the Resolution Unit 
within the Bank of Greece (2012). A 
number of cooperative banks (2012) 
and resolving ATEbank (2012); The 
second Financial Support Program 
(2012); Recapitalization and 
Restructuring of the Greek banking 
sector by Piraeus Bank (2013); 
completion of banking sector 
restructuring and the resolution of 
commercial banks that failed to meet 
capital needs (2013); Cooperative 
banks restructuring through capital 
raised by some cooperative banks and 
the resolution of three weak institutions 
(2013); Stress testing of Greek banks 
(2014); Key actions to address NPL 
management (2014). 
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Croatia During the 1990s’ transition, 
Croatia faced many challenges, 
such as heavy state involvement 
in real sector; weak corporate 
governance; harmful 
privatization process and weak 
institutional framework.  
Ineffective banking supervision 
system to enforce prudent 
governance in banks.  Moreover, 
weak bank regulations allowed a 
number of private agents with 
insufficient capacities to engage 
in banking activities.  The 
Private Banks provided cheap 
financings to founding 
companies (exposure 
concentration, misaligned 
incentives).  
The financial difficulties 
spread across the banking 
system, particularly in the fifth 
largest bank, then affected 
other inadequately governed 
institutions.  Banking crisis did 
not affect the real estate sector. 
In 1996, the government 
finalized the resolution process 
by writing-offs of NPLs, 
recapitalizing three large 
banks, and then sold them to 
foreign financial institutions by 
the end of 1999 and early 2000.  
Additionally, banks increased 
their market share by credit 
expansion as well as very 
aggressive interest rate policies 
(excessive credit growth).  
Many systematic risks 
accumulated in the banking 
sectors.  Due to extensive credit 
losses, a few banks defaulted 
during transition period. 
In 1998, government assistance to the 
fifth largest bank.  However, three were 
major losses in several other medium-
sized and small banks that led to a surge 
in deposit outflows and a loss 
confidence.  In 1996, failure of the 
recapitalization process from public 
resources led to bankruptcy procedures 
as well as privatizing three large banks. 
Low interest rates encouraged lending 
using the emergency liquidity facility 
as a part of the measurements of the 
monetary authorities and the central 
bank. 
 The global financial crisis 
caused a slowdown in capital 
inflows, an abrupt contraction of 
the domestic demand as well as 
insufficient external demand 
which hindered the recovery.  
The Croatian economy faced a 
major structural growth crisis.  
The failure of a few small private 
banks caused the inability to 
survive in a long-lasting 
recessionary environment, heavy 
exposure to the SME among 
others.  During the transition 
period, several banks lost 
capital, so state funds were 
injected (2007-2012). 
The collapse of Lehman 
Brothers caused a global risk 
and high price volatility as well 
as a fall in liquidity and 
unpredictable markets.  The 
financial system and exchange 
rate were stable, but the 
government repaid the 
maturing debts according to the 
countercyclical monetary and 
macroprudential policy of the 
central bank.  The risk 
premiums in Croatia increased, 
and stress spread to the 
domestic financial system 
through foreign financial 
markets.  International debt 
market conditions worsened 
with higher CDS premiums for 
the parent banks of the five 
largest domestic banks.  
Adverse developments in CDS 
premiums increased the risk 
perception of Italian parent 
banks compared to other 
countries, such as Austria or 
France.  A partial withdrawal of 
the parent banks' funding 
increased pressures on the 
foreign currency liquidity and a 
higher level of stress due to the 
international securities. 
Parent institutions of domestic 
banks financed excessive credit 
growth that led to high level of 
current account deficit and 
increased foreign debt while 
the competitiveness indicators 
declined.  Weak financial 
markets with limited supply 
pressured the domestic 
currency exchange rate and 
financial assets’ prices. A 
strong credit activity, declining 
During the global financial crisis, the 
CNB gradually released the previously 
established banking system's liquidity 
reserves to facilitate the domestic 
sectors due to the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers after a panic episode by 
domestic depositors.  The CNB 
supported the foreign currency 
liquidity.  In 2004, the marginal reserve 
requirements (MRR) were applied to 
slow down the growth of banks' 
external debt by allocating a significant 
share of their net foreign borrowing into 
a special account held with the central 
bank (above 50%) as interest-free 
foreign currency deposits.  In late 2008, 
CNB reduced the general reserve 
requirement rate to 14% to improve the 
domestic financing conditions for the 
corporate sector.  However, the 
government needed substantial 
financing aid.  Weak currency occurred 
due to limited net inflow of foreign 
capital which reduced the minimum 
required foreign currency claims rate to 
20.0% at the beginning of 2009, 
releasing even more foreign exchange 
liquidity.   Adjustments of substantial 
foreign currency liquidity provided 
exchange rate stability and overall 
financial stability of the economy.  The 
Croatian banking sector was under 
control and very well capitalized during 
the crisis.  No fiscal interventions were 
required for banks' resolution.  Lending 
declined and the economy recovered in 
early February 2010.  The CNB 
lowered the minimum required foreign 
currency claims rate to 17% to improve 
banks' credit potential, decrease banks’ 
regulatory costs, while lending rates 
improved financing conditions for the 
corporate and household sectors.  The 
European debt markets hit the Croatian 
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the quality of granted loans and 
intensified risk-taking by the 
banks. The CNB applied 
several innovative instruments 
to address the intensive foreign 
borrowing of banks, which led 
to the maintenance of 
considerable capital and 
reserved liquidity.  The central 
bank imposed macro-
prudential measures, and 
slowed down banks' foreign 
borrowing practices, while 
encouraging the parent 
companies to inject capital 
instead.  Furthermore, the CNB 
(Crotian National Bank) 
restricted growth to 12% 
annually.  The banks that 
increased over 12% were 
forced to purchase low yielding 
CNB bills worth 50% of the 
number of excessive 
placements.  The well 
capitalized Croatian banking 
system was a result of the 
active macro-prudential 
policymaking.  However, at the 
peak of the global financial 
crisis, the central bank had built 
considerable buffers to pursue 
countercyclical policy. 
However, the CNB could not 
stop some domestic sectors 
from borrowing in foreign 
currency that led to the 
deterioration of the net 
international investment 
position despite of the central 
bank’ efforts.  Financing 
domestic demands by foreign 
savings prior to crisis caused 
major long-term damage to the 
Croatian economy.   
economy deeply by the mid-2011, the 
increase in the cost of foreign 
borrowing plus the withdrawal of 
parent banks’ funding had led to 
depreciation pressures on the kuna 
exchange rate. 
The central bank participated in four 
foreign exchange interventions to 
maintain the relatively stable exchange 
rate.  In October 2013, the CNB 
switched to a rules-based approach 
which required banks to valuate assets 
more objectively, to spot credit losses 
in time so that banks engaging in debt 
restructurings (evergreening of loans).  
Due to low liquidity of the real estate 
market, there was a strong increase in 
provisioning costs that negatively 
reflected on banks’ earnings, which 
successfully encouraged banks to speed 
up the process of NPL resolution.  
Hungary There was a severe recession 
despite of enacting bankruptcy 
legislation in 1992, enterprise 
restructuring was doomed by 
inadequate reforms to bank 
lending policies.  The current 
account deficit was almost 10% 
of GDP during 1993-94, and the 
external debt rose to higher 
level.  The fiscal deficit grew to 
8% of GDP in 1994 and a 
crawling currency was 
introduced in 1995.  
Stabilization and growth were 
hampered and there was heavy 
foreign borrowing by enterprises 
during 1994-95, and strong 
capital inflows in the second half 
of 1995.  
During the transition period, 
excessive loans caused 
insolvent enterprises.  Banks 
had insufficient capital, were 
improperly regulated and were 
unrestricted controlled by 
unqualified owners.   The high 
inflation was reduced after the 
transition period.  The 
accumulation of Hungarian FX 
loans remained along with high 
household indebtedness and 
vulnerability of the Hungarian 
government.  The excessive 
credit growth was caused by 
high reliance on short-term 
debt and derivative 
instruments.  HUF sharply 
depreciated against CHF while 
the material credit and 
refinancing risks grew.  
Crisis was solved by Injection of state 
funds. 
 2007 international liquidity 
crisis 
The crisis was imported due to 
the interconnectedness of 
In order to restore investors' 
confidence, there was an ease in 
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financial intermediaries and 
high external weakness of the 
domestic financial system in 
Europe.  The frozen 
international money market hit 
the Hungarian economy hard.  
During the crisis, financing the 
public and banking sector was 
hindered by the foreign 
exchange and the renewal of 
swaps risks.  Additionally, the 
public sector’s budget deficit 
increased, in addition to higher 
levels of local currency interest 
rates.  Low funding costs 
caused an increase in the 
foreign currency-denominated 
loans.  Furthermore, there was 
a decline in the international 
money markets and a build-up 
of vulnerability in the 
Hungarian banking sector 
where most of the loans were in 
foreign currency (mainly Swiss 
francs).  As a result, the 
banking sector experienced an 
increased rate of non-
performing loans, followed by 
deteriorated profitability during 
the downturn. 
financing and liquidity tensions.  
Governmental loans were provided for 
commercial banks. Unconventional 
monetary policy measures addressed 
the weak bank lending activity.  
Ireland The crisis emerged in the 
domestic banking sector.  The 
main Irish banks generated 
revenue by using cheap sources 
of short-term wholesale funding 
during real estate market crisis.  
The leverage of domestic private 
sector increased pre-crisis as 
well as indebtedness.  The 
excessive credit growth, 
excessive maturity mismatch, 
Concentration risk unified with 
dangers of misaligned incentives 
during the Irish crisis of 2008- 
2013.   
The Irish banks had significant 
liquidity problems due to 
global debt markets, domestic 
macroeconomic imbalances 
and unstainable banking sector 
strategies.  In terms of 
macroeconomic imbalances, a 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy 
position and policies that 
coincided with favorable 
domestic demand factors, the 
banking sector was largely 
funded construction/property 
boom by relying on cheap 
sources of external wholesale 
borrowing. 
The scale of the banking crisis required 
intervention, and was significant due to 
frozen international funding markets.   
Guarantees on certain types of 
liabilities, expansion of the Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme, recapitalizations of 
domestic banks, nationalizations of 
some domestic banks, establishment of 
an asset management agency (i.e., 
NAMA).  Targeted deleveraging, fiscal 
consolidation measures and structural 
reforms (ECB/IMF/EU Program) for 
external assistance were all required.  
The emergency liquidity assistance was 
extended and nationalization the 
Anglo-Irish Bank. 
Italy Leverage and rapid credit 
growth as early signs of crisis, 
exposure concentration.  During 
the 1990s, several public-owned 
banks were affected by 
allocative and cost 
inefficiencies, and then severely 
hit by the strong recession.  
Italian banks had to increase 
their exposures toward riskier 
borrowers from 1991-1997.  
Unstable currency markets and 
connected with the ERM crisis 
(the Lira exited the ERM) hit 
the Italian economy hard, a 
large number of small banks in 
the south were in distress in the 
‘90s.  
The crisis was managed through usual 
instruments and in line with private 
market solutions.  Poor management 
caused weakness in two large Italian 
banks (Sicilcassa and Banco di Napoli), 
and then bank sector fell into the 
political sphere.  Two banks were 
becoming privatized after applying for 
reconstruction reforms.  Various forms 
of public interventions were applied 
and had an impact of 0.5% in terms of 
1996 GDP. 
 Tensions in the sovereign bonds 
markets in the euro area from 
2011-2013. 
The instability was caused by 
tensions in the sovereign bonds 
markets in the euro zone.  As a 
result, the Italian economy 
developed three main 
transmission channels: 
Banking channel:  Banks could 
not generate funds due to the 
deterioration of sovereign 
Several monetary policy measures were 
taken by the Eurosystem to assist the 
euro-area banks obtain liquidity.  
Several interventions at the European 
institutional level to improve risk were 
aimed to strengthen financial system 
stability and to restore market 
confidence.  Banks’ funding difficulties 
were largely eased by the ECB’s 
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creditworthiness in terms of 
higher cost of credit and 
unavailability of loans through 
the traditional bank lending 
channel.  Increasing the Banks’ 
cost of funding significantly as 
well as the cost of new loans to 
non-financial corporations and 
households in 2011.  
Confidence channel:  The EU’s 
sovereign debt crisis had an 
impact on businesses and on 
consumer confidence.  The 
crisis was magnified by many 
factors: fiscal consolidation 
policies (i.e. cuts on 
government spending and/or 
tax increases) to recover public 
finances; the negative 
developments in the equity and 
the bond markets were the 
reason for the internal and 
external financing of 
investment expensive and 
affected consumption and the 
deterioration of the economic 
outlook. 
Trade and financial linkages 
channel:  The impact of 
sovereign debt markets had a 
continental effect through 
international trade and 
financial linkages.  During the 
sovereign debt crisis Italian 
intra-EMU, exports decreased 
markedly. 
decisions to reduce the official rates at 
the end of 2011, also by launching the 
two 3-year longer-term refinancing 
operations.  In mid-2012, due to 
emerging economies, a large inflow of 
capital and structural reforms made the 
economy more resilient to forthcoming 
shocks.  In 2013, the financial 
conditions improved due to the crucial 
contribution of monetary policy. 
Lithuania   Lack of proper legislation, weak 
bank regulation, low bank 
capitalization levels and 
excessive risk taking.  The weak 
internal environment, difficulties 
to measure the riskiness of bank 
borrowers and poor bank loan 
portfolios led to excessive credit 
growth to risky borrowers.  
Borrowers started defaulting on 
their loans, and then banks were 
unable to maintain sufficient 
liquidity.  Expansionary 
monetary policy and supply 
shortages led to hyperinflation 
from 1992 to 1993. There also 
was a credit crunch and 
recession from 1991 to 1993. 
 
During deflation, many 
borrowers were unable to repay 
loans and the number of bad 
loans rose.  Moreover, bank 
profit margins fell 
dramatically.  From 1994-
1996, the banks’ insolvency 
problems led to a loss of 
confidence in the banking 
sector and a freeze on interbank 
market lending.  The crisis was 
caused by insufficient banking 
regulation and supervision at 
the micro level as well as an 
undeveloped banking sector. 
 
The Lithuanian parliament adopted 
crisis management policies, such as: 
1. Increasing banks’ liabilities 
to shareholders and board 
members.  
2. Number of legislations 
required in case of banks’ 
insolvency via government 
interventions channels. 
3. Liquidity loans and 
purchased government 
securities from troubled 
banks by Bank of Lithuania.  
An ease on this requirement 
for commercial banks was 
temporarily lifted. 
 Lithuania's banking sector had 
extensive and unbalanced credit 
growth.  Looseness of bank 
credit standards affected the 
quality of the banks' balance 
sheets.  Furthermore, extensive 
credit growth and high housing 
prices led to increase the private 
debt and (subsequently) to credit 
defaults (2004–2008). 
The crisis was caused by both 
external and internal factors.  
Investment started slowing 
down due to the lack of 
confidence related to the weak 
macroeconomic environment 
when GDP growth became 
negative.  Reduced economic 
activity, increased private debt, 
high housing prices and high 
nominal interest rates led to an 
increase in non-performing 
Government intervention increased the 
deposit insurance limit.  The Bank of 
Lithuania lowered the mandatory 
reserve requirement to 4%. 
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loans and a sharp tightening of 
bank credit standards.  
Lithuania suffered from low 
house prices and an economic 
slowdown.  In late 2009, the 
Lithuanian parliament 
increased the deposit insurance 
limit to end the crisis.  
Luxembourg  Exposure concentration, 
excessive credit growth and 
moral hazard.  The crisis was 
caused by sovereign debt of The 
Dexia, Lehman Brothers, the 
Icelandic banks and the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis. (2008-
2010). 
The troubled Luxembourger 
financial system and the 
bankruptcy of Dexia.  The 
origin of the Dexia’s crisis was 
complex and partially related to 
the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and the sovereign debt 
crisis.  The Luxembourg 
economy is relatively small and 
highly connected to the euro 
area. 
The governments of Belgium, 
Netherlands and Luxembourg got 
involved to save Fortis.  Capital was 
injected after the Luxembourger 
government acquired approximately 
50% of the Fortis' equity.  In October 
2008, Fortis emerged in Belgium and 
Luxembourg, but was renamed as BGL 
in Luxembourg.  The stress ended 
October 2010 when the bank was 
ultimately incorporated into BGL BNP 
Paribas.  Finally, Dexia was 
restructured by the Belgian government 
in 2011. 
Latvia There was a sharp decline in the 
Latvian economy and in bank 
profit margins on trade financing 
when inflation was reduced from 
almost 100% in 1992 to 26% in 
1994.  A term of trade shock and 
the collapse of the eastern 
markets occurred early in the 
transition.  The crisis was trigged 
during transitional phase of the 
Latvian economy by insufficient 
financial sector regulatory 
framework, poor corporate 
governance and fraudulent 
activities of the banks. 
In 1995, the banking crisis was 
due to the transitional phase of 
the Latvian economy which 
was exacerbated by the 
immature and weak regulatory 
framework of the financial 
system.  Many banks had poor 
corporate governance and risk 
management practices, so they 
were unable to absorb losses 
after relying on speculative and 
opportunistic bets on macro-
financial developments.  
Moreover, the key causes of 
banks' insolvencies were due to 
fraudulent activities. 
Further strengthening and 
developments to the financial sector 
regulatory framework.  
 Leverage and rapid credit 
growth as early signs of crisis; 
high dependence on the market 
funding of one of the largest 
banks in the country; exposure 
concentration; moral hazard and 
misaligned incentives ("too big 
to fail"); and an unfavorable 
external environment from 
2008-2010.  
Prior to the financial crisis, 
economic growth was driven 
by foreign capital inflows 
which led to excessive credit 
and real estate sector 
developments.  As tensions in 
the international capital 
markets increased, the financial 
soundness of the second largest 
bank came into question until it 
was nationalized at the end of 
2008.  As foreign capital 
inflows were hindered, the 
Latvian economy had to 
undergo a large cyclical and 
structural adjustment.  The non-
performing loans rose sharply 
as the economy began a 
massive pay off process. 
The Latvian Government took over the 
second largest bank in terms of assets - 
Parex Banka.  The Goverment support 
to Parex Banka consisted of both capital 
and liquidity injections, as well as state 
guarantees to roll-over Parex Banka’s 
funding in a form of syndicated loans.   
Netherlands Despite the fact that the Dutch 
banks were too big to fail, 
mismatches and market 
illiquidity motivated by all 
vulnerabilities played an 
important role (except in 
infrastructure resilience).  The 
first trouble that the Dutch 
financial institutions faced was 
funding problems (excessive 
Severe funding problems were 
experienced. High leverage and 
higher levels of dependency on 
market funding exposed the 
Dutch banks to the shocks that 
hit the global funding markets.  
The combination of the global 
financial crisis and credit 
exposure impacted the Dutch 
Nationalization of Fortis ABN AMRO, 
provided capital to banks and insurance 
companies, a funding guarantee 
scheme, an increase of the insured 
amount under DGS, ultra-easy 
monetary policy as well as fiscal 
stimulus in 2009 and again in 2010.  
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leverage and maturity mismatch) 
which were worsened by 
exposure to concentrations. 
financial sector as well as the 
deep recession in 2009. 
Norway During the 1970s and the 1980s, 
the Norwegian economy had a 
period of excessive credit 
growth and leverage due to the 
softness of bank capital 
requirements.   
Excessive loan growth 
occurred after the lifting of the 
quantitative regulation of bank 
lending in 1984 which led to a 
sharp decline in both residential 
and non-residential real estate 
prices.  Additionally, the 
monetary policy was pro-
cyclical with the Norwegian 
krone, higher German interest 
rate, lower inflation, changes in 
the tax rules, thus higher after-
tax real rate of interest above 
the 7% in 1992.  Many small 
banks failed caused by higher 
losses on their loan books from 
1988 to 1990.  A year later two 
of the three largest banks 
collapsed and largest bank had 
severe loan losses in 1992. 
A write down of equity and instruments 
of ownership was cancelled according 
to bank losses.  Deposit guarantee funds 
assisted acquisitions of failed banks.  
Injection of new capital into the larger 
failed banks, reduction of management 
costs, and restructuring their lending 
policies. The Central bank helped 
Norwegian banking sector and by the 
end of 1993, the second largest bank 
raised new equity in the market.  
 Market liquidity problems 
(2008-2009). 
The Norwegian interbank 
market was affected by both the 
failure of Lehman Brothers and 
the freeze on international 
funding markets, which caused 
a halt in operation.   
Nevertheless, Norwegian 
banks did not have credit 
losses, but they incurred higher 
funding costs.  
Liquidity problems were tackled by the 
generous general supply of central bank 
liquidity.  The Norwegian State Finance 
Fund supported the troubled banks with 
an injection of capital. 
 
Poland During the recession period in 
1990-91, banks raised interest 
rate spreads to overcome the 
problems.  Lending to 
enterprises was too risky and 
banks preferred to lend to the 
government.   
The Hyperinflation that followed 
the transition ended in 1990-91, 
and the fiscal deficit was 
reduced.  Economic 
inefficiencies in the centrally 
planned economy (low 
productivity of foreign debt-
financed investments) and the 
external shocks, such as the oil 
crisis and globally rapid increase 
in interest rates from 1981-1994. 
The root of the crisis was 
foreign public debt growth in 
concert with the inoperative 
centrally planned communist 
economy, oil price shocks and 
rising global interest rates 
which resulted in a loss of 
creditworthiness and an 
increase in both the risk 
premium and cost of 
borrowing. The rapid growth of 
the public debt in the 1970s 
brought positive economic 
impact as debts were paid off 
by importing of foreign goods, 
licenses and technology which 
were a considered as source of 
foreign currency.  However, 
with the inefficiencies in the 
centrally planned economy and 
a competitive global market, 
Poland ran a trade deficit. 
By end of 1975, Poland faced 
insolvency.  Poland relied on 
new loans to pay off old loans 
which accelerated the growth 
of the indebtedness.  US trade 
sanctions affected the Polish 
economy until 1987.  As a 
result, the economic crisis 
worsened, as well as the loss of 
creditworthiness which led to 
an increase in the risk premium 
and the cost of borrowing. 
Several regulatory steps were taken by 
the Polish government to regain the 
balance in the economy, to halt the 
growing domestic demand and 
excessive investments.  These measures 
were inefficient and required 
renegotiation of the loan's payment 
terms.  Multiple agreements were 
introduced to reschedule debt, but 
proved unsuccessful until restructuring 
in 1991 and 1994.  The Polish financial 
system had been a mono-bank system, 
so there were no financial sector 
interventions until independence in 
January 1989. 
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 1992-1996 The bank sector suffered from 
the following: lack of economic 
incentives in the centrally 
planned economy prior to 1989, 
mismanagement and rapid 
growth of the sector in the 
1990's which negatively 
affected the resilience of the 
system.  The banking sector 
was incapable of facing the 
economic turmoil in the early 
1990's. 
During the transition process 
1989-1990, most loans were 
owned by two state companies.  
An episode of high/hyper-
inflation as well as high interest 
rates pushed some borrowers 
into debt spirals.  Then, the 
banking sector in Poland 
experienced problems, such as 
an unrestrained credit policy, 
rapid uncontrolled growth, 
insufficient or lack of control of 
mechanisms and corporate 
governance, a low level of 
capital, inexperienced 
managerial staff and weak 
prudential regulations. 
The main focus of NBP (National Bank 
of Poland) and the government 
interventions were to restore trust in the 
banking sector.  In 1993, the 
government had partially guaranteed 
"bad loans" and commenced issuing 
restructuring bonds that were 
transferred to the banks in order to 
recapitalize.  Together with other 
transfers, the support for the banking 
system reached to 2.7% of 1996 GDP. 
In 1995, the Bank Guarantee Fund was 
established, nevertheless with a limited 
scale of guarantees.  The NBP took 
some measures to provide liquidity in 
the market, such as suspension of the 
obligation to keep capital at the central 
bank and open access to refinancing 
loans.  To improve the resilience of the 
system, the banking licenses were 
tightened and the banks were 
encouraged to consolidate.  The larger 
banks in Poland and some foreign 
investors were encouraged to purchase 
some of small ailing banks in order to 
restructure them. 
 
Portugal External trade imbalances, high 
foreign interest rates and high 
government deficits from 1983-
1985. 
The roots of the crisis were due 
to external trade imbalances, 
high foreign interest rates and 
high government deficits.  
IMF’s assistance to finance the 
sovereign banks and stabilize the 
economy, plans to cut back on public 
investment, a rise in domestic interest 
rates, coupled privatizations and labor 
market reforms. 
 The US subprime crisis hit the 
Portuguese banking system’s 
access to funds in the 
international wholesale markets 
and caused significant losses in 
securities and the financial asset 
portfolio.  Later, the Portuguese 
sovereign debt crisis strained the 
bank’s liquidity situation in 
terms of funding costs as well as 
the capacity to access 
international debt markets.  
Mostly the domestic imbalance, 
non-financial private sector 
indebtedness, and the sovereign 
debt crisis had an exaggerated 
the impact of the crisis from 
2008-2015. 
Signs of distress in the banking 
system were observed after the 
nationalization of Banco 
Português de Negócios.   In late 
2008, the crisis was 
significantly escalated due to 
the Portuguese sovereign debt 
crisis. 
In late 2008, the Portuguese 
government preserved the stability of 
the financial system by strengthening 
the state of guarantees for bank 
deposits.  Headquartered credit 
institutes had provided by voluntary 
recapitalization plans and state 
guarantees to address the securitized 
debt by Portuguese banks.  In April 
2011, Banco de Portugal was required 
to maintain a minimum Tier 1 ratio over 
8%.  In May 2012, the Economic and 
Financial Assistance program was 
established a better and stable financial 
system and made structural adjustments 
of the Portuguese economy.  The eight 
major Portuguese banking groups had 
to generate medium term funding, 
capital with minimum amount of 
regulatory capital at all times.  
Additionally, a program was designed 
to validate the data on assets and 
solvency assessment.  Furthermore, it 
had included changes in deposit 
guarantees funds; a new regulation was 
established for the minimum Core Tier 
1 capital ratio of 9% at the end of 2011 
and then 10% from the end of 2012 
onwards.  The solvency and 
deleveraging assessment framework 
was enacted under the Financial 
Assistance Program; in October 2011 
Financial Markets, Institutions and Risks, Volume 3, Issue 3, 2019 
 
                                                                     ISSN (online) – 2521-1242 ISSN (print) – 2521-1250 
87 
 
 
according to specific risk profile for 
each institution / banking group. 
Romania External shock (1981-1989) The 1977 oil crisis and the 
higher interest rates resulting 
from the 1982 global debt crisis 
caused a surge in the cost of the 
external debt.  In 1981, the 
Romanian debt had been 
burdened by the rapid increase 
of the FED interest rates during 
the late 1970s.   By the end of 
1981, Romanian banks debt to 
foreign banks was high, and the 
IMF declined to waive the 
stand-by loan without reaching 
agreement with the foreign 
banks, then an agreement was 
signed in December 1982.  
The Romanian government 
implemented tougher measurements to 
pay back the total amount of external 
debt after deteriorating international 
support. In 1988, the Ceaușescu 
government declined contracting 
further loans from the IMF and ended 
its permanent dependence on Western 
financing. 
 Leverage and rapid credit 
growth as early signs of crisis, 
liberalization of the exchange 
rate and liberalization process 
for the goods with administered 
prices from 1996-2000. 
Systematic errors in previous 
years, taking risky policies by 
offering high interest rates 
(mostly on household deposits) 
and lending credits to troubled 
companies with poor financial 
and economic conditions, or 
practicing connected lending.  
Consequently, banks were 
unable to recover credits and 
collect interest, causing a 
steady decrease in profitability, 
liquidity, and solvency ratios.  
A very high non-performing 
loan ratio (over 20% in 1997 – 
1998 and 10% in 1996), 
combined with bankruptcy of 
the largest domestic bank 
(Bancorex held more than 20% 
of the total assets) in 1999.  
Also, beginning in 1996, many 
banks faced financial 
difficulties, such as Dacia Felix 
Bank, Credit Bank, Columna, 
Bankcoop and Bancorex 
forcing them to stop payments 
as the financial difficulties 
persisted into 1998.   During the 
liberalization period, the 
exchange rate and the process 
for goods with controlled prices 
contributed to significant 
currency depreciation and high 
inflation. 
Bankruptcy legislation and National 
Bank of Romania Act addressed by 
banking system.  In 1996, Dacia Felix 
Bank and Credit Bank had to be 
restructured or go into bankruptcy 
according to legal action took by the 
National Bank of Romania.  In 1997, 
banks had completed financial 
corrective measures taken by the 
NBR’s Board of Directors.  The central 
bank cancelled the licenses of two 
banks in 1997.  Granted especial loans 
to some sectors, off balance-sheet 
commitments, credit due to 
mismanagement decisions, etc.  In 
April 1997, the IMF agreed to a 13-
month stand-by credit to support the 
Romanian government’s economic 
program. The National Bank of 
Romania implemented a package of 
bank purging measures to heal the 
banking system as a whole in 1999. 
 
 Leverage and rapid credit 
growth as early signs of crisis, 
mismatches and market 
illiquidity from 2007- 2010. 
The Romanian economy was 
hit by speculative capital 
outflows, while excessive 
credit growth built up, high 
NPL ratios and low 
profitability.  The Romanian 
capital market acted in a similar 
manner as its European 
counterparts.  Shortly 
thereafter, the European 
sovereign debt crisis led to a 
rise in the CDS quotes after 
2011. 
Between September 2008 and June 
2012, the monetary authority lowered 
the policy rate from 10.25% to 5.25% 
to preserve adequate monetary 
conditions for both credit demand and 
supply.  The goal was to contain 
inflation and to spur sustainable 
economic growth. 
Sweden  The combination of inflation, 
low real interest rates and 
This crisis was rooted in the 
real estate bubble, excessive 
The Swedish Government issued a 
"blanket guarantee" to cover the entire 
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deregulation of the financial 
markets triggered higher real 
estate prices.  Then, a quick drop 
in real estate prices caused a 
sharp increase of credit losses 
from 1991-1997. 
lending to the commercial real 
estate sector and aggravated by 
the international slowdown.  
The CRE bubble was caused by 
de-regulation of bank lending.  
However, in the mid 1980's, 
there was a substantial increase 
in bank lending while the real 
estate prices declined, thus 
banks suffered heavy losses. 
banking system in September 1992.  In 
1993, a governmental program was 
introduced to restructure the failed 
banks.  The government injected capital 
into banks, while the assets of failed 
banks were divided into "good"-bank 
and "bad"-bank parts.  
 Mismatches and market 
illiquidity caused the crisis.  
Moreover, excessive credit 
growth, loss of confidence and 
financial problems in the 
markets were also key elements 
of this crisis.  Fortunately, there 
was not a severe level of credit 
losses, hence “no credit crunch” 
from 2008-2010. 
Even though the crisis was a 
domestic issue, it was still an 
external shock to areas with a 
heavy dependence on short-
term international financing 
and the growth of credit 
exposures towards the Baltic 
economies for two of the major 
banks. 
A system of government guarantees 
offered to the participated banks and 
capital injections, however, it was 
limited, and the deposit insurance 
system covered higher amounts of 
savings.  Moreover, the Central bank 
(the Riksbank) issued a range of 
measures to provide liquidity, both in 
SEK and in foreign currency, as well a 
quick and sharp reduction of its interest 
rate. 
Slovenia Mismatches and market 
illiquidity, exposure 
concentration from 1991 to 
1994.  
The Yugoslavian secession hit 
the Slovene banks in three 
channels: the liquidity 
operations were not permitted 
to Slovene banks; the Yugoslav 
debtors became unenforceable; 
Slovene non-financial 
corporations (owners of the 
most Slovene banks) had lost 
access to the Yugoslav market, 
resulting in impaired bank 
assets through an increase of 
loan delinquencies, as well 
limiting bank recapitalization 
by the non-government sector. 
Bank losses were written off against 
capital; bank rehabilitation as 
subordinated liabilities that were 
government issued and held against 
non-performing assets acquired and 
paid for in the agency's own bonds. 
 Leverage and rapid credit 
growth as early signs of crisis: 
The crisis was due to high 
leverage, high LTD ratios and 
decreasing lending standards 
which caused a severe credit 
crunch and the reduction of 
credit availability especially to 
over-indebted non-financial 
sector.  Mismatches and market 
illiquidity: Slovenian banking 
system relied mostly on short-
term funding that caused a sharp 
decline after the outbreak of the 
last crisis.  Exposure 
concentration: Slovenian 
economy relied on very specific 
sectors and tightly connected to 
the banks’ ownership which 
increased the concentration risk. 
Misaligned incentives: The 
management granted excessive 
amounts of credit without proper 
risk analysis from 2009-2014. 
Banks failed to extend short 
loans due to the freeze of the 
wholesale financial markets, 
thus they caused bad assets in 
bank books, low loan loss 
provisions and increased 
capital requirements.  During 
the financial distress when 
capital was difficult to raise, a 
process of deleveraging began 
while trying to reach the 
required capital adequacy ratio.  
Loans issued by the Slovenian 
Banks were the prevailing 
source of external finance for 
the economy, so when their 
lending rates were increased, 
their ability to raise funds was 
diminished.  
Banks’ recapitalization such as NLB 
d.d., NKBM d.d., Banka Celje d.d. , 
Abanka Vipa d.d. as well as Factor 
banka d.d. and Probanka d.d.; write-
down of subordinated instruments; 
certain non-performing claims were 
transferred from recapitalized banks to 
the Bank Assets Management 
Company (BAMC); BAMC acquired 
assets paid with guaranteed bonds.  The 
last transfers of NPLs and last 
recapitalization measures took place in 
December 2014. 
 
Slovakia Misaligned incentives. Banks 
that were to-big-to fail and 
underlying problems, such as the 
accumulation of bad loans due to 
political pressure, the economic 
structural and legal system after 
Started with the liquidity 
problem of one of the banks in 
December 1997.  In 1998, the 
banking sector suffered losses 
from non-performing loans 
and increasing in NPL ratio 
before the restructuralisation 
The National Central provided a 
liquidity support for one bank by end of 
1997.  Three largest banks were 
recapitalized by the state and the 
National Bank of Slovakia. Banks’ bad 
loans removed, loans granted to 
insolvent companies were replaced 
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1989 and also weak banks and 
supervision from 1997-2002. 
of up to 50 % in the case of 
corporate loans.  From the end 
of 1999 to June 2000, the loans 
that had been granted to 
insolvent corporates were 
replaced by government bonds. 
with government bonds. Staged 
restructuralisation process started and 
banks’ privatization was ended by 
March 2002 as all three banks were 
bought by foreign banking groups. 
 
United 
Kingdom 
From 1973-1977, leverage and 
rapid credit growth as early signs 
of crisis, mismatches in balance 
sheets.  In the early 1970s, the 
UK credit expansion as well as 
the economy expanded rapidly 
("Barber boom").  The crisis 
became visible as the liquidity 
constraints in the money 
markets.  Some financial 
institutions relied upon liquidity 
for their operations; 
sophisticated depositors revised 
their exposure and further 
affected the liquidity of 
institutions. 
The crisis was caused by credit 
expansion (property-related 
assets).  During the 
depreciation of the sterling in 
1973, the BOE (Bank of 
England) had to raise the 
lending rate to support the 
pound.  Moreover, access to the 
wholesale funding market was 
hammered by the 
supplementary special deposit 
scheme which generated 
significant liquidity 
constraints.  Therefore, the 
currency crisis indirectly 
triggered the liquidity crisis, 
however, the real problem was 
in the banking sector.   
Several supporting measures and rescue 
strategies were applied to a number of 
troubled individual institutions.  For 
example, Bank of England assigned and 
participated in “Lifeboat”. 
 Leverage and rapid credit 
growth as early signs of crisis, 
mismatches in balance sheets 
from 1991-1994.  
In the European Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) crisis, a fast 
credit expansion related to 
property assets was the trigger.  
Without the support of the 
authorities, many small 
institutions had no access to 
their funds at the Bank of 
Credit and Commerce 
International.  The ERM 
required a higher interest rate.  
This aggravated the economic 
slowdown and lowered 
property prices.  Next, the 
unpredictable status of 
financial institutions 
constrained wholesale market 
liquidity for SIB's from a 
macroprudential perspective. 
Emergency liquidity support provided 
to UK banks. 
 2007-present, leverage and rapid 
credit growth as early signs of 
crisis, mismatches in balance 
sheet prior to the 2008 crisis.  
The instability was due to a 
weak financial system that 
perished during an extended 
global credit boom; rapid 
expansion of balance sheets; 
uncertain liquidity and credit 
quality; and poorly funding 
structures. 
Bank recapitalization and special 
liquidity schemes to swap temporarily 
banks’ high-quality mortgage-backed 
besides other securities for UK 
Treasury Bills in 2008.  Additional 
supportive measures from the Bank of 
England, ECB, Federal Reserve, Swiss 
National and Canadian banks to ease 
the pressures on short-term funding 
markets (FSRs in July 2009). 
Source: completed by author. 
The outcomes of this research are (Rsource: own study): 
 Research question Results Reasons 
1. Determine whether it is plausible to only 
focus on the interaction between profitability 
and macroeconomic factors for future 
examinations of European banks soundness. 
Inconclusive  1. Without supervision, taking into 
consideration the rating systems outlooks 
and regulatory (such as Basel III), it is 
difficult to predict the soundness for the 
long run. Relying on the Moody’s rating 
outlook and other supervisory institutes 
may provide a future indication.  
Source: completed by author. 
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Conclusion 
During the crises, European banks heavily addressed the macro profile as well as government and central bank 
interventions, emergency liquidation, financial stability programs, reconstructing reforms, strength of the 
supervisors and monetary policies.  I conclude that during crises, lending in foreign currency, fiscal discipline, 
GDP, inflation, high interest rates in foreign currency deposit and loans escalated the problem.  With reference 
to my previous article, any new methodology has to consider the external, industry and internal determinants 
of profitability in the equation of bank soundness while setting minimum capital requirements, liquidity and 
bail-in-able liabilities.  Therefore, we should strive to improve the existing methodologies and re-regulatory 
supervision.  However, most scholars have focused on the impact of the macroeconomic environment on bank 
profitability using inflation rates, GDP, and interest rates.  Moreover, macro profile, regulatory and 
supervision, profitability and rating system are also four significant variables in evaluating bank soundness.  
On the microeconomic level, there is always a possibility to introduce new variables due to new regulatory, 
or banking supervisory institutions regulations, while at macroeconomic level, the ability to predict these 
factors positively effects bank soundness.  In summary, macroeconomic adjustments were called upon during 
the crises due to the decline of capital adequacy and deterioration of asset quality as well as losses in both 
foreign exchange and foreign currency liquidity. 
The evidence shown affirms the following statement “is it possible to predict the financial distress in European 
banks based on systematic financial information and reports, rating system, Basel minimum capital 
requirements and stress tests,…, etc.“ to absorb any financial crises similar to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
US subprime crisis, financial crisis (2008) and the Asian financial crisis, if there was a prevention mechanism 
to halt the contagion mechanism. Under these backgrounds, many banking sectors, financial analytics, 
academicians tended to be against a collaborative effort to build a unified predictive model to ensure the 
soundness of banks. Therefore, any framework to assess the financial stability must address three main issues: 
the risks and vulnerabilities of banks individually and world-wide, the type of risks that cause the 
vulnerabilities and the contagion mechanisms that magnify the impact of the crisis. The next Figure may 
summarize the most foundations of the topology of Soundness of banks.   
 
Figure 4: The Topology of Soundness of Banks. Resource: Own study. 
Source: completed by author. 
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Appendix A 
Table 3: The most repeated macroeconomic determinants in selected Empirical Studies 
Name of articles Type of 
studies 
Journal Variables Methodology  
1. Determinants of Bank 
Profitability in 
Ukraine. 
Empirical 
Studies 
Undergraduate 
Economic 
Review  
1. GDP Growth  
2. Inflation  
3. Exchange Rate 
4. Concentration  
A linear model 
of profitability  
2. Concentration and 
other Determinants of 
Bank Profitability in 
Europe, North 
America and 
Australia. 
Empirical 
Studies 
Journal of 
Banking & 
Finance  
1. Concentration  
2. Market Growth  
3. Inflation  
A linear model 
of profitability  
3. Determinants of 
Commercial Bank 
Profitability in 
Malaysia  
Empirical 
Studies 
Journal of 
Money, Credit, 
and Banking 
1. Inflation  
2. Market Growth  
3. Market Interest 
4. Market Share 
5. Regulation 
A linear model 
of profitability 
4. What Explains the 
Low Profitability of 
Chinese Banks? 
Empirical 
Studies 
Journal of 
Banking & 
Finance  
1. Real GDP growth  
2. Inflation  
3. Interest Rate  
4. Maximum spread between 
loan and deposit rates 
5. Volatility of interest rates 
6. Concentration  
7. System Credit Growth 
8. Interest Rate  
Regression 
Model 
5. Factors influencing 
the profitability of 
domestic and foreign 
commercial banks in 
the European Union. 
Empirical 
Studies 
Research in 
International 
Business and 
Finance  
1. Inflation  
2. GDP Growth  
3. Concentration  
4. The ratio total assets of the 
deposit money banks divided 
by the GDP. 
5. The ratio stock market 
capitalization to total assets 
of the deposit money banks.   
6. The ratio stock market 
capitalization to GDP.  
Regression 
Model 
6. Determinants of bank 
profitability in a 
developing economy: 
empirical evidence 
from the Philippines 
Empirical 
Studies 
Asian Academy 
of Management 
Journal of 
Accounting & 
Finance 
1. GDP Growth Rate  
2. Inflation  
3. Money supply growth 
4. The ratio of stock market 
capitalization. The variable 
serves as a proxy of financial 
development  
Linear 
Regression 
Model 
7. Determinants of bank 
profitability before 
and during the crisis: 
Evidence from 
Switzerland 
Empirical 
Studies 
Journal of 
International 
Financial 
Markets, 
Institutions and 
Money 
1. Effective Tax Rate  
2. Real GDP Growth  
3. Interest Rates  
4. Concentration  
A linear model 
8. Determinants of 
banks’ profitability: 
evidence from EU 27 
banking systems 
Empirical 
Studies 
Procedia 
Economics and 
Finance 20 
(2015) 
1. Inflation  
2. GDP Growth  
A linear model 
of profitability 
9. Banks’ Profitability in 
Selected Central and 
Eastern European 
Countries 
Empirical 
Studies 
Procedia 
Economics and 
Finance 16 
(2014) 
1. Inflation  
2. GDP Growth  
3. Crisis  
4. Concentration  
A linear model 
of profitability 
10. Bank-specific, 
industry-specific and 
macroeconomic 
determinants of bank 
profitability 
Empirical 
Studies 
Journal 
ofInternational 
Financial 
Markets, 
1. Inflation  
2. Cyclical Output  
3. Concentration  
A linear model 
of profitability 
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Institutions and 
Money 
11. Bank Specific and 
Macroeconomic 
Determinants of 
Commercial Bank 
Profitability: 
Empirical Evidence 
from Turkey 
Empirical 
Studies 
Business and 
Economics 
Research 
Journal 
1. Annual Real GDP Growth 
Rate  
2. Inflation Rate  
3. Real Interest Rate  
A regression 
model 
12. Profitability of the 
Korean banking 
sector: Panel evidence 
on bank-specific and 
macroeconomic 
determinants. 
Empirical 
Studies 
Journal of 
Economics and 
Management 
1. GDP  
2. Inflation  
3. Concentration 
4. The ratio of stock market 
capitalization 
A regression 
model 
13. Financial structure 
and bank profitability. 
Empirical 
Studies 
Journal of 
Economics and 
Management 
1. Annual Real GDP Growth 
Rate  
2. Inflation  
3. Tax Rate  
A regression 
model 
14. Determinants of 
profitability of 
domestic UK 
commercial banks: 
panel evidence from 
the period 1995-2002 
Empirical 
Studies 
Money Macro 
and Finance 
(MMF) 
Research 
Group 
Conference 
1. The Rate of GDP Growth  
2. Inflation  
3. Concentration  
4. The ratio of stock market 
capitalization to total assets 
of the deposit money banks. 
This variable serves as a 
proxy of financial 
development as well as a 
measure of the size of 
financial market and the 
relationship between bank 
and market financing. 
A regression 
model 
15. What determines the 
profitability of banks? 
Evidence from Spain 
Empirical 
Studies 
Accounting & 
Finance 
1. Concentration  
2. Annual Real GDP Growth 
Rate  
3. Inflation  
4. Interest Rates  
A regression 
model 
16. Bank liquidity and its 
determinants in 
Romania 
Empirical 
Studies 
Procedia 
Economics and 
Finance 
1. Interest Rate  
2. Credit Risk Rate 
3. Inflation  
4. GDP Real Growth Rate  
5. Unemployment 
A multivariable 
regression model 
and Z-score 
17. Profitability 
Determinants of the 
Macedonian Banking 
Sector in Changing 
Environment 
Empirical 
Studies 
Procedia-
Social and 
Behavioral 
Sciences 44 
(2012) 
1. GDP Growth Rate  
2. Concentration  
3. EBRD index 
4. Inflation  
A regression 
model 
18. Profitability of 
foreign and domestic 
banks in Central and 
Eastern Europe: does 
the mode of entry 
matter? 
Empirical 
Studies 
 1. Concentration  
2. Inflation  
3. Host Interest Rate  
4. Host GDP  
A logit model 
for dependent 
variables and 
regression model 
19. Determinants of bank 
Profitability in the 
South Eastern 
European region 
Empirical 
Studies 
MPRA Paper 1. Inflation  
2. Real per Capita Income  
A regression 
model 
20. Are Foreign Banks 
more Profitable than 
Domestic Banks? 
Home- and Host-
Country Effects of 
Banking Market 
Structure, 
Governance, and 
Supervision 
Empirical 
Studies 
Journal of 
Banking & 
Finance  
1. GDP Growth  
2. Inflation Rate  
3. Real Interest Rate  
 
Panzar-Rosse H-
statistic to 
measure 
Banking Market 
Structure and 
regression model 
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21. Bank-specific, 
industry-specific and 
macroeconomic 
determinants of bank  
Empirical 
Studies 
 1. Inflation   
2. Cyclical Output 
A regression 
model 
22. The determinants of 
banks’ profits in 
Greece during the 
period of EU 
financial integration 
Empirical 
Studies 
Managerial 
Finance  
1. GDP Growth  
2. Inflation  
3. The growth of the money 
supply as measured by 
currency circulation 
4. The ratio stock market 
capitalization to total assets 
of the deposit money banks. 
5. The ratio total assets of the 
deposit money banks divided 
by the GDP 
6. Concentration  
A regression 
model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23. How Accurately Can 
Z-score Predict Bank 
Failure? 
Empirical 
Studies 
 1. GDP Growth  
2. Inflation  
3. Concentration 
Z-Score 
Methodology  
24. Consolidation in 
banking and financial 
stability in Europe: 
Empirical evidence 
Empirical 
Studies 
Journal of 
Banking & 
Finance 
1. Concentration  
2. GDP per Capita  
3. Real GDP Growth  
4. Inflation  
5. Real Interest Rate  
6. Credit Growth 
Z-Score 
25. Competition, 
Efficiency, and 
Stability in Banking. 
Empirical 
Studies 
Financial 
Management 
1. GDP per Capita  
2. Concentration  
Bonne Model, Z- 
Score 
Methodology 
26. The Main 
Determinants of 
Bank's Stability. 
Evidence from 
Romanian Banking 
Sector 
Empirical 
Studies 
Procedia 
Economics and 
Finance 
1. Inflation Rate 
2. GDP Growth Rate 
Z-Score Model 
27. Does market structure 
matter on banks’ 
profitability and 
stability? Emerging 
vs. advanced 
economies. 
Empirical 
Studies 
Journal of 
Banking & 
Finance 
1. Real GDP Growth  
2. Stock market turnover ratio 
3. Inflation  
4. Concentration  
Z-Score 
Methodology 
and regression 
model 
28. Basel Core Principles 
and bank soundness: 
Does compliance 
matter? 
Empirical 
Studies 
Journal of 
Financial 
Stability 
1. GDP Growth  
2. Inflation  
3. Exchange Rate  
Z-Score 
Methodology 
and regression 
model 
29. Bank Safety and 
Soundness and the 
Structure of Bank 
Supervision: A Cross 
Country Analysis 
Empirical 
Studies 
 1. Concentration 
2. GDP per Capita  
3. Average Rate of Real GDP 
Growth  
CAMEL 
variables as well 
as regression 
model 
30. Banking on the 
principles: 
Compliance with 
Basel Core Principles 
and Bank Soundness.  
 The World 
Bank 
1. BCP Index 
2. Rule of Law 
3. GDP per Capita 
4. Depreciation 
5. Growth 
6. Inflation 
7. Inflation Volatility 
Z-Score, 
Moody’s Rating, 
and Regression 
model 
Source: Own study. 
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